Agricultural Trade Consequences of Asia's Economic Growth: A Case Study of Wine
Rice wine is common in Asia, but wine made from grapes has had a very minor role traditionally. Prior to this century grape wine was consumed only by Asia's elite, and produced only in tiny quantities and mostly in just Japan and -from the late 1980s -China.
1 However, income growth and a preference swing towards this traditional European product has changed the consumption situation dramatically. China is also expanding its area of vineyards and is now the What is the future of Asia in the world's wine markets? Will China's wine production eventually exceed its needs domestically? How important will wine demand be in the four nextmost-populous Asian countries (India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh)? Who else will satisfy Asia's growing thirst? How will the various wine quality categories develop in Asia?
Which wine varieties will Asians prefer? What roles will excise and import taxes play? What is the future of the austerity drive China introduced in 2014 that has dampened conspicuous consumption of luxuries such as expensive wines?
This chapter seeks to address these types of questions. It first draws on comparative advantage theory, then looks at the recent history in more detail before presenting some projections for the next five years under various assumptions about economic growth rates and real exchange rates. It concludes that China is by far the most dominant player, and that it is set to continue to change global markets for wines dramatically, just as it has been doing and will continue to do for so many other products.
Determinants of Comparative Advantage in Wine
According to the workhorse theory of comparative advantage developed in the 20 th century, we should expect agricultural trade to occur between relatively lightly populated economies that are well-endowed with agricultural land and those that are densely populated with little agricultural land per worker (Krueger 1977) . Leamer (1987) develops this model further and relates it to paths of economic development. If the stock of natural resources is unchanged, rapid growth by one or more countries relative to others in their availability of produced capital (physical plus human skills and technological knowledge) per unit of available labour time would tend to cause those economies to strengthen their comparative advantage in non-primary products. By contrast, a discovery of minerals or energy raw materials would strengthen that country's comparative advantage in mining and weaken its comparative advantage in agricultural and other tradable products, ceteris paribus. It would also boost national income and hence the demand for nontradables, which would cause mobile resources to move into the production of nontradable goods and services, further reducing farm and industrial production (Corden 1984) . As port etc.
infrastructure is developed and costs of trading internationally fall for the country, more products would move from the nontradable to the tradable category (Venables 2004) .
At early stages of development of a country with a relatively small stock of natural resources per worker, wages would be low and the country is likely to have an initial comparative cost advantage in unskilled labour-intensive, standard-technology manufactures. Then as the stock of industrial capital grows, there would be a gradual move toward exporting manufactures that are relatively intensive in their use of physical capital, skills and knowledge. Natural resource-abundant economies, however, may invest more in capital specific to primary production and so would not develop a comparative advantage in manufacturing until a later stage of development, at which time their industrial exports would be relatively capital intensive.
The above theory of changing comparative has been used successfully to explain Asia's resource-poor first-and second-generation industrializing economies becoming more dependent on imports of primary products from their resource-rich trading partners (see, e.g., Anderson and Smith 1981) . It also explains well the 20 th century flying geese pattern of comparative advantage and then disadvantage in unskilled labour-intensive manufactures as some rapidly growing economies expand their endowments of industrial capital per worker relative to the rest of the world -the classic example being clothing and textiles (Ozawa 2009 ).
But how helpful is that theory for explaining comparative advantage in wine? Grapebased wine is dependent on winegrapes as an input, and they are too perishable to be transported internationally without at least the first stages of processing. The lowest-quality winegrapes and wine can be produced in less-than-ideal regions and sold as an undifferentiated commodity without a great deal of knowhow, but only at prices barely above the cost of production for most vignerons. To produce a higher-quality product that can be differentiated from other wines by consumers, and thus attract a higher price, requires far more technological knowledge and skills in grape growing, wine making and wine marketing in addition to access to high-quality vineyard land or at least grapes therefrom. To be economically sustainable the producer also needs ready access to financial capital to cover the very considerable up-front establishment costs and to finance the years when receipts fall short of outgoings, including the first seven years before cash income begins to exceed cash outlays. Secure property rights over the vineyard land are essential as well, since the lifetime of vines is at least 30 years and can be much longer.
Of particular importance as determinants of a country's competiveness in producing wine rather than other farm products are the three T's of terroir, traditions, and technologies.
Terroir refers to various pertinent aspects of climate, topography, soils, geology, etc. that determine the quality of the vine's growing conditions. Vineyard site selection therefore is crucial. Experience has determined the best sites and most-suitable grape varieties in longestablished regions, whereas in new regions science has to be used to speed the process of approaching the potential of any region to produce quality winegrapes. The conventional wisdom is that winegrapes grow best between the 30 o and 50 o temperate latitude bands north and south of the equator, and where rain is concentrated in the winter and summer harvest times are dry.
Lower latitudes typically result in lower-quality winegrapes, although moving to higher altitudes can help because temperatures decline about 5 o centigrade per 1000 metres of elevation (Gladstones 1992; Ashenfelter and Storchmann 2014) .
Traditions determine not only how a product is produced but also the extent of local consumer demand. This is important for wine because typically local demand is the easiest and least costly for producers to satisfy, as there are relatively high fixed costs of entry into new export markets (Friberg, Paterson and Richardson 2011) . Stigler and Becker (1977) argue that economists should begin by assuming tastes are stable over time and similar among people and then focus on explaining differences in consumption patterns using standard determinants such as relative prices and real incomes. That view is supported for food even in the poorest settings. For example, recent studies in both India and China demonstrate that introducing subsidies to rice and wheat consumption does almost nothing to boost nutrition, as consumers tend to eat the same amount of nutrients but do so by switching from less-preferred coarse grains to now-subsidized rice and wheat (Jensen and Miller 2011; Kaushal and Muchomba 2013) . Social norms and religion can also influence interest in consumption of alcoholic beverages.
Also, when preferences are non-homothetic, trade patterns can be affected by growth in domestic demand (Markusen 2013) . Wine typically has an income elasticity of demand of greater than one. Hence as a country's per capita income rises, there would be a decline in its comparative advantage in wine unless its wine productivity grew sufficiently faster than income, other things equal.
As for technologies, there is always potential to improve on traditional production, processing, entrepreneurship and marketing, be that by trial and error of practitioners over the generations or via formal investment in private and public research and development (R&D (Gerguad and Ginsburg 2008) .
Another study, of vineyard sale values in Oregon, finds that while appellation reputation has some economic value, each location's physical attributes are not closely related to wine prices (Cross, Plantinga and Stavins 2011) . A recent book by Lewin (2010) begins its section on wine regions with the New World rather than the Old World, to emphasize the point that wines almost everywhere are manipulated by winemakers as they endeavour to make use of available knowledge to produce the products most desired by their customers. What they choose to produce is increasingly being affected by how they can maximize profits through satisfying consumer demand, rather than by what they prefer to make with their available resources.
New technologies in agriculture have long tended to be biased in favor of saving the scarcest factor of production, as reflected in relative factor prices. Hayami and Ruttan (1985) emphasize that the focus of R&D investments thus has been driven in part by changes in factor prices, and in particular by the rise in real wages. That has resulted in the development and/or adoption of labour-saving technologies such as mechanical harvesters and pruners for vineyards Relative factor endowments affect the comparative advantage of a country in terms also of the quality of its exported products. New trade theory suggests richer, capital-abundant countries will export higher priced, higher-quality goods (Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman 2011; Nayak 2011) .
A further set of influences on comparative advantage that can be important at certain times relates to currency exchange rate movements. A macroeconomic shock such as Argentina's devaluation by two-thirds in late 2001, or a doubling in the Australian-US dollar exchange rate over the subsequent decade due largely to Australia's mining boom, have had major (and opposite) impacts on the international competiveness of wineries in those two Southern
Hemisphere countries (Anderson and Wittwer 2013 ).
Asia's Wine Production, Consumption and Trade to Date
The previous section provides plenty of reasons for not expecting much winegrape production in most Asian countries: there is almost no tradition of wine consumption domestically; most people's incomes until very recently have been too low for wine to be a priority; there are very few regions with suitable terroir, especially where it is not hot and/or humid; and in numerous Islamic Asian countries their religion frowns on alcohol. It is thus not surprising that the only Asian countries with a significant area of grapevines (of which only a fraction is used in wine making) are parts of Japan, Korea and China. About 1% of South Korea's small crop area has been devoted to vines over the past two decades, and just 0.4% of Japan's since the 1970s, with little change in either country over those periods. By contrast, the share of crop area under vines in China has been growing rapidly, doubling since the turn of the century. Even so, that share in China is still not quite as high as in Japan, which suggests there is scope for substantially more expansion without encroaching very much on land used for food production (bearing in mind also that quality winegrapes grow better on poor slopes than on fertile flat land While it is true that India, Thailand and even Myanmar have some vineyards and have begun producing wine from them, the volumes are as yet insignificant.
China's volume of wine production has been growing more than twice as fast as its area under vines. This has been possible not just because the share of domestically grown grapes destined for wine has risen but also because China imports a lot of wine in bulk and blends it with wine made from Chinese grapes. This is feasible because national labeling laws are such that a bottle marked 'Product of China' is required to have only 10% local content. So despite the recent rapid growth in wine consumption in Asia, the potential for further expansion remains enormous, given the current very low level of per capita consumption and share of wine in total alcohol purchases. The rapid aging and educating of the populations in Asia's emerging economies also lends itself to a continuing expansion of demand for wine there.
Certainly the new Chinese Government's austerity drive has discouraged consumption of expensive wines and other luxuries in 2014, but that influence is likely to fade over time and in any case it impacts much less on lower-quality wines which are by far the most voluminous (Table 1) .
No Asian country has yet produced grape wine for export in noticeable quantities. As for import dependence, it varied in 2009 from 15% in China (up from 8% in 2000-05) to 68% in Japan, 96% in Korea, and 100% for all other Asian countries (Anderson and Nelgen 2011, Table   54 ). Thus China's share of Asian wine imports is much less than its share of consumption, especially when expressed in value terms because the unit value of China's imports in 2009 was only half the Asian average. Even so, China together with Hong Kong (which re-exports at least one-fifth of its wine imports to China) dominate Asia's aggregate wine imports (Figure 3) .
One needs to be careful not to diminish the role that some other Asian countries play as significant importers of high-quality wine though. As can be seen in Figure 3 , the shares of those countries in the value of world imports far exceed their volume shares, reflecting the fact that the average price of their imports is well above that of most other countries. For small producers of super-premium wines, especially in nearby Australia, they are important and profitable markets.
Needless to say, Asian wine imports would be considerably larger if import tariffs and excise taxes on wine were less. In numerous Asian countries they exceed those for beer and spirits on a per litre of alcohol basis (Table 3) . The decision by Hong Kong to eliminate its tariff on wine imports in early 2008 is partly why its imports in Figure 3 are so much higher by the end than the beginning of the previous decade.
Even without any reforms of those taxes, consumption and imports of wine in Asia are destined to rise over the years to come. How much they might rise, and how much domestic wine production might expand to satisfy at least some of that demand increase, is not easy to predict. A recent study nonetheless has focused on projecting the world's wine markets over the next five years. The next section reports on its findings as they relate to Asia.
Modeling the World's Wine Markets to 2018
Anderson and Wittwer (2013) have revised and updated a model of the world's wine markets that was first published by Wittwer, Berger and Anderson (2003) . In it, wine markets are disaggregated into non-premium (including bulk), commercial-premium, and super-premium are not unreasonable to expect. However, if China's income growth were to grow slower than the rate assumed in the base case, and if that meant China's RER did not continue to appreciate slightly, wine import growth would be slower. For the rest of the world, the long trend preference swing away from non-premium wines is assumed to continue now that recession in the North Atlantic economies has bottomed out.
Both grape and wine industry total factor productivity is assumed to grow at 1 percent per year everywhere, while grape and wine industry capital is assumed to grow net of depreciation at 1.5 percent per year in China but zero elsewhere. This means that China's production rises by about one-sixth, one-quarter and one-third for non-premium, commercial-premium and superpremium wines between 2011 and 2018 -which in aggregate is less than half that needed to keep up with the modeled growth in China's consumption. Of course if China's wine production from domestic grapes were to grow faster than the rate assumed in the base scenario, wine imports would increase less. To project global wine markets forward, it is assumed that aggregate national consumption and population grow from 2011 to 2018 at the rates shown in Appendix Table 1 and that preferences, technologies, and capital stocks continue to change as described above, plus that to appreciate, and simultaneously its domestic grape and wine production capital grows twice as fast. Table 3 suggests China's production of grapes and wine would grow at similar rates in the first two scenarios: by one-sixth for non-premium wine and a bit over one-quarter for premium wines. In the third scenario those rises increase to one-quarter for non-premium wine and to more than one-third for premium wines.
The income, population and preference changes together mean that Asian consumption volumes grow dramatically over the period to 2018 except in Japan where the increase is confined to super-premium wine (Table 4) . For China the increase is around two-thirds in the first two scenarios and a little less than one-half in the third (slower growth) scenario, whereas for other emerging Asian countries they increase only one-seventh or one-sixth. Given the vast differences between Asian countries in their 2011 consumption levels though, China dominates the volume growth globally while Western Europe sees a decline in its consumption which dampens somewhat global consumption growth (Figure 4 ). The fall in Europe is mainly due to the hefty weight in its consumption of the declining non-premium wine sub-sector.
When combined with the changes projected in production, it is possible to get a picture of what is projected to happen to wine trade. Table 5 provides projections for the main wine-trading regions. In terms of volumes, world trade expands 6% by 2018 in the base scenario, and 7% in the Alternative 1 scenario in which RERs change. Virtually all of that increase in those two scenarios is due to China's import growth. In the Alternative 2 scenario, in which China imports less, global trade also expands less (by only 4%). In terms of the real value of global trade, however, the upgrading of demand elsewhere means that China accounts for smaller fractions of the growth in the global import value, namely 36%, 43%, and 30% in the Base, Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 scenarios, respectively. In all three scenarios China dominates Asian import growth, and the value of global wine trade rises by about one-sixth (last row of Table 5 ).
It is not surprising that China is such a dominant force in these projections, given the dramatic growth in its wine consumption over the past dozen years (Figure 1 ), the expectation of continued high growth in its income over the next five years (albeit somewhat slower than in the past five years), and the assumption that China's winegrape production growth cannot keep pace with domestic demand growth. As a result, China's share of consumption supplied domestically falls from its 2009 level of 85% to 57%, 54% and 67% in 2018 the Base, Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 scenarios for 2018, respectively.
France is projected to become even more dominant in imports by China in the Base scenario where exchange rates are assumed to remain at 2011 levels. However, in the more-likely
Alternative 1 scenario with a part-reversal of recent exchange rate movements, the increase in China's imports from Australia is almost the same as that of France in value terms -and they lose equally if China's import growth slows further as in Alternative 2. In volume terms it is
Chile that enjoys the greatest increase in sales to China in the two Alternative scenarios. The impacts of these changes on the shares of different exporters in sales to China's are summarized in Projected bilateral trade changes more generally are summarized in Table 6 for the mostlikely Alternative 1 scenario. All major wine-producing regions benefit from China's burgeoning demands. In volume terms that is slightly at the expense of growth in their exports to other regions, although not in value terms because of the modeled upgrading of quality in those other markets. For Australia and Other Southern Hemisphere exporters, projected growth in real export values in local currency terms is even larger than in the US$ terms shown in Table 6 due to the modeled real depreciation of the currencies of this group. For example, Australia's export value growth of US$933 million converts to an Australian dollar increase of AUD1360 million.
Australia's projected volume growth in this scenario is an extra 21ML of wine per year being exported to China during 2011 to 2018. That should be manageable, as it is the same rate of increase in Australia's sales to the United States during the first decade of this century.
Summary and Implications
China has already become by far the most important wine-consuming country in Asia, and the above projections point to the enormous speed with which China may become an even more is the sheer size of China's adult population of 1.1 billion -and the fact that grape wine still accounts for less than 4 percent of Chinese alcohol consumption -that makes this import growth opportunity unprecedented. It would be somewhat less if China's own winegrape production increases faster, as in the Alternative 2 scenario above, but certainly in as short a period as the next five years that is unlikely to be able to reduce the growth in China's wine imports very much, especially at the super-premium end of the spectrum.
Of course these projections are not predictions. Where exchange rates move, and how fast various countries' wine producers take advantage of the projected market growth opportunities in Asia, will be key determinants of the actual changes in market shares over the coming years. Not all segments of the industry are projected to benefit, with non-premium producers facing falling prices if demand for their product continues to dwindle as projected above. But those exporting firms willing to invest sufficiently in building relationships with their Chinese importer/distributor -or in grapegrowing or winemaking as joint venturers within China -may well enjoy long-term benefits from such investments, just as others have been doing and will continue to do for so many other products besides wine.
Meanwhile, the super-premium wine market in several other emerging Asian economies will remain an important and growing area of profitable sales for exporters such as Australia. The three largest Islamic countries in Asia (Bangladesh, Indonesia and Pakistan), by contrast, are far more remote possibilities. India potentially could be more important sooner, but internal and external trade restrictions and high taxes have to date confined the rapid growth in sales (but from a very low base) to domestic firms in India. Source: Projections from global economy-wide modeling by Anderson and Strutt (2012) .
